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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Petitioner appeals from the summary dismissal of her successive petition 
for post conviction relief because the court dismissed the petition on different 
grounds than those provided in the notice of intent to dismiss. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
This case has a long and tortured history as explained by the district court 
in its Amended Order Dismissing Successive Petition (hereinafter Amended 
Order): 
On November 4, 1999, Petitioner Sandra Jonas was sentenced to a 
unified term of life in prison with a fixed term of twenty-five years 
upon a plea of guilty to second degree murder in Jerome County 
Case No. CR-FE-1998-162. Thereafter, Petitioner filed a Rule 35 
motion for a reduction of sentence, which was denied by the district 
court. Petitioner then appealed her conviction, sentence, and the 
denial of her Rule 35 motion. On December 15, 2000, the Court of 
Appeals affirmed the district court's conviction, sentence, and 
denial of the Rule 35 motion. Petitioner then filed a petition for 
rehearing and a petition for review with the Supreme Court. Both 
were denied, at which point the judgment became final. The Court 
of Appeals issued its Remittitur to the district court on April 18, 
2001. Petitioner filed an I.C.R. 34 motion for a new trial on October 
29, 2001 followed by an alternative motion for leave to withdraw her 
guilty plea. Two evidentiary hearings were held on Petitioner's 
motion to withdraw her plea. She filed her first petition for post-
conviction relief on April 23, 2002 in Jerome County Case No. CV-
2002 1536. On May 10, 2004, her motion to withdraw her guilty 
plea was denied because the evidence she presented did not 
amount to "manifest injustice." Petitioner appealed that decision 
and the Court of Appeals affirmed the district court, although on 
different grounds, on June 30, 2006. Petitioner filed a petition for 
review, which was denied, and a remittitur was issued on April 19, 
2006. Then, on August 26, 2008, following a hearing, the district 
court issued its Order Dismissing Petition for Post-Conviction Relief 
in Jerome County Case No. CV-2002-1536. 
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Petitioner appealed that dismissal on the grounds that the district 
court erred by summarily dismissing her petition because she 
raised genuine issues of material fact that she received ineffective 
assistance of counsel and that her guilty plea was involuntary (and 
that the plea was involuntary without first being afforded notice). In 
an unpublished opinion dated April 14, 2010, the Court of Appeals 
affirmed the district court's summary dismissal on the grounds that 
Petitioner's petition and supporting materials "contained only bare 
and conclusory allegations which the district court was not required 
to accept." A remittitur was issued on June 29, 2010. 
Amended Order, p. 1-2. (R. p. 121-122.) 
As to the procedure of the instant post conviction, the district court 
explained as follows: 
Finally, on May 12, 2011, Petitioner filed the current successive 
petitioner for post-conviction relief (Jerome County Case No. CV-
2011-559). On May 2, 2012, following the Court's Notice of Intent to 
Dismiss, which granted Petitioner's request for court-appointed 
counsel, Petitioner filed her Amended Successive Petition for Post 
Conviction Relief, followed by a Verified Amended Successive 
Petition for Post Conviction Relief filed on June 12, 2012, with 
leave from the Court. Thereafter, on June 13, 2012, the State filed 
its Answer to Amended Successive Petition for Post Conviction 
Relief. 
Petitioner's original successive petition stated eighteen grounds for 
post-conviction relief, many of which had already been raised in 
prior motions or were not actionable claims under the Uniform Post 
Conviction Procedure Act (UPCPA). The original petition was 
supported only by Petitioner's statement of facts. This Court 
addressed the original successive petition in its Notice of Intent to 
Dismiss, which is incorporated herein by reference. The Amended 
Petition condensed these claims into one multi part claim of 
ineffective assistance of post-conviction counsel, which will be 
addressed in this opinion. 
Amended Order, p. 2-3 (footnote omitted). (R. p. 122-123.) 
The court ultimately dismissed the amended successive petition. (R. p. 
128.) As part of the order, the court also issued a Rule 54(b) certificate directing 
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that the order shall be a final judgment upon which an appeal can be taken. (R. 
p. 130.) 
Petitioner timely appeals. (R. p. 132.) 
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ISSUE 
Whether the district court erred when it summarily denied the successive post 
conviction relief petition on grounds different than those contained in the notice of 
intent to dismiss. 
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ARGUMENT 
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED WHEN IT SUMMARILY DENIED THE POST-
CONVICTION RELIEF PETITION ON DIFFERENT GROUNDS THAN THOSE 
IN THE NOTICE OF INTENT TO DISMISS 
A Standard of Review at Trial and on Appeal 
An application for post-conviction relief under Idaho Code § 19-4901 is 
civil in nature and is an entirely new proceeding distinct from the criminal action 
which led to the conviction. Nguyen v. State, 126 Idaho 494 (Ct.App. 1994). In 
order to prevail in a post-conviction proceeding, the applicant must prove, by a 
preponderance of the evidence, the allegations upon which the request for post-
conviction relief is based. Id. 
Summary disposition is the procedural equivalent of summary judgment 
under I.R.C.P. 56, with the facts construed and all reasonable inferences made in 
the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Gonzales v. State, 120 Idaho 
759 (Ct.App. 1991 ). Allegations contained in the verified petition are deemed 
true for the purpose of determining whether an evidentiary hearing should be 
held. Martinez v. State, 125 Idaho 844 (Ct.App. 1994). If the allegations do not 
frame a genuine issue of material fact, the court may grant a motion to summarily 
dismiss, but if the application raises material issues of fact, the district court must 
conduct an evidentiary hearing. Id. 
In determining whether a motion for summary disposition was properly 
granted, the appellate court reviews the facts in the light most favorable to 
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petitioner and determines whether, if true, they would entitle petitioner to relief. 
Saykhamchone v. State, 127 Idaho 319 (1995). 
B. Standard of Review Regarding a Claim of Ineffective Assistance of 
Counsel 
The standard for evaluating a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is 
well established, being set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 
(1984). The "benchmark for judging any claim of ineffectiveness must be 
whether counsel's conduct so undermined the proper functioning of the 
adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied on as having produced a just 
result." Id. at 686. 
Strickland set forth a two-prong test which a defendant must satisfy in 
order to be entitled to relief. The defendant must demonstrate both that his 
counsel's performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and 
that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, the result of 
the proceedings would have been different. Id. at 687-88; State v. Charboneau, 
116 Idaho 129 (1989); Gibson v. State, 110 Idaho 631 (1986). 
C. The Claims and the Court's Rulings 
As explained in the Court's Notice of Intent to Summarily Dismiss 
Successive Petition for Post-Conviction Relief Pursuant to I.C. 19-4906, Order for 
Return of Property, and Order Granting Motion for a Court Appointed Attorney 
(hereinafter Notice of Intent to Summarily Dismiss), the pro se Petitioner raised 
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what the court characterized as 18 grounds for post-conviction relief, which 
follow: 
1) Self-defense/actual innocence; 
2) Ineffective assistance of counsel/conspiracy; 
3) No investigator/investigation for defense; 
4) No evidence against defendant; 
5) Challenge of conviction, sentence, etc.; 
6) US and state constitutional violations (see No.s 8 and 9 below); 
7) Prosecutorial and appointed defense attorney (see No. 2 above) 
misconduct; 
8) Excessive unduly harsh sentence; 
9) Illegal searches and seizures; 
10) Perjury; 
11) Miscarriage of justice; 
12) Wanton and affirmative misconduct; 
13) Bias/prejudice of state and defense attorneys; 
14) Conspiracy of state and defense attorneys based on religion 
and gender; 
15) Duress by prosecution, mediator, and defense attorneys; 
16) Actual substantial prejudice from delay of 2 filed petitions; 
17) Prejudice through denial of case records; 
18) Anything remembered after the fact. 
Notice of Intent to Summarily Dismiss, p. 1-2. (R. p. 30-31.) 
The grounds for the court's intended summary dismissal are as follows: 
. . . . Notably, the petitioner's application is supported only by a 
nine-page statement of facts. This does not amount to admissible 
evidence sufficient to make a prima facie case as to each element 
of Petitioner's numerous claims. In fact, Petitioner appears to have 
listed an exceptionally wide array of claims, some of which she has 
asserted in prior petitions and motions, supported only by her 
description of the facts as she sees them. 
Thus, Petitioner does not present adequate grounds upon which to 
base a successive application for post-conviction relief. Petitioner is 
hereby given twenty (20) days to reply to this proposed dismissal. 
I.C. § 19-4906(6). 
Notice of Intent to Summarily Dismiss, p. 2 (footnote omitted). (R. p. 31.) 
The court did appoint counsel, ruling as follows: 
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In the current petition, this Court has noted that the asserted claims 
are unsupported by admissible evidence sufficient to establish a 
prima facie showing as to each element of her claims. This is due 
and owing, in part, to the fact that she has essentially alleged every 
potential ground for post-conviction relief available, and then some. 
Additionally, Petitioner has been in prison since her sentencing in 
1999, and it is therefore presumed that she has inadequate funds 
with which to hire her own attorney. In an effort to provide Petitioner 
with adequate resources to narrow her petition and present a 
potentially valid claim, this Court will grant her motion for 
appointment of counsel. 
Notice of Intent to Summarily Dismiss, p. 4 (emphasis added). (R. p. 33.) 
Counsel was appointed, who did file an amended successive petition for 
post conviction relief. (R. p. 42-48.) Counsel also filed a motion requesting 
additional time in order to have the Petitioner verify the petition, and the court 
granted the motion. (R. p. 72, 76.) Counsel then filed what was entitled Verified 
Amended Successive Petition for Post Conviction Relief (hereinafter Verified 
Amended Successive Petition). 1 (R. p. 78-85.) As will be shown below, the 
court noted that the petition wasn't actually verified, but it treated it as if it was. 
Petitioner specifically alleged as follows in the Verified Amended 
Successive Petition: 
a. In Dunlap's filed Original Amended Petition, Dunlap failed to 
verify the Original Amended Petition as required by Idaho Code § 
19-4902(a). 
b. In the Original Amended Petition, Dunlap failed to assert any 
specific facts to support Petitioner's allegations of her underlying 
ineffective assistance of counsel and merely offered bare and 
conclusory assertions of the same. 
1 Appellant notes that at first glance the instant record appears confusing 
because the amended successive petition and verified amended successive 
petition contain as attachments, the initial amended petition for post conviction 
relief and the order dismissing it. 
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c. Specifically, Dunlap failed to assert the following facts as to 
Petitioner's underlying criminal case, which Petitioner hereby states 
and asserts are true: 
i. That on or about October 25, 1998, Petitioner was in her 
ex-husband's house. At that time, her intention was to remove 
some items which were hers from the house. Petitioner had placed 
a .22 pistol, which belonged to Petitioner, on a kitchen counter in 
the upstairs kitchen area of the house. 
ii. That some time after arriving at the house, Petitioner's ex-
husband's girlfriend, Mata Jones ("Jones"), presented at the house. 
Petitioner followed Jones downstairs in the house to inquire as to 
why Jones was present there. 
iii. Upon entering the downstairs area of the house, Jones 
began to yell at Petitioner. As the Jones's yelling escalated, Jones 
hit petitioner with a telephone which was in Jones' hand. The 
impact caused a laceration on Petitioner's hand, and Petitioner's 
hand began to bleed. 
iv. Following the physical altercation with the phone, Jones 
went back upstairs in the house. Petitioner then hung up the phone 
with some force, as Jones had left it off the hook. Petitioner then 
proceeded upstairs to see what Jones was doing. 
v. Upon going upstairs, Petitioner could not locate Jones, 
and Petitioner began to search for Jones. After some time, 
Petitioner did not find Jones, and Petitioner returned to the kitchen 
area of the house. At that time, Jones presented behind the 
Petitioner. 
vi. Jones began once again to yell at Jonas, which yelling 
began to be more escalated. During Jones yelling, Jones told 
Petitioner that she was going to marry Petitioner's ex-husband and 
that all of Petitioner's prior possessions were going to soon belong 
to Jones. Jones said, "Miles is mine, I've been fucking him for 
years." Jones further stated that she would "own" Petitioner's 
children and could do with the children as she pleased. Also during 
the argument, Jones asserted that she was going to "do [Petitioner 
and Petitioner's] children in". 
vii. While Jones yelled at Petitioner, Jones regularly turned 
her gaze toward Petitioner's .22 pistol that was located on the 
countertop next to the kitchen sink. Jones was physically closer to 
the pistol than Petitioner. 
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viii. At one point, Jones looked at the pistol, and Petitioner 
stated, "Don't even think about it." At that time, Jones moved 
quickly for the pistol, and Petitioner followed. 
ix. Jones grabbed the pistol and began to point it towards 
Petitioner. Petitioner was fearful for her life and the life of her 
daughter who was downstairs because Petitioner believed that the 
.22 bullet could go through the floor and hit her daughter. 
x. Petitioner grabbed Jones's hand, which held the pistol, as 
Jones pointed the pistol towards Petitioner. At that time, the pistol 
discharged, and the bullet hit Jones in the face. 
xi. Jones's body then fell forward, and her head landed near 
Petitioner's feet. Petitioner saw that Jones was still breathing as 
Jones made a sound with her breath. After a second of collecting 
herself after the first shot, Petitioner proceeded to Jones's side to 
investigate her breathing. As Petitioner proceeded to bend down 
toward Jones's body, the pistol, which was loosely contained in 
Petitioner's hand, accidentally discharged for a second time after 
Petitioner's hand hit Petitioner's knee, which caused a .22 bullet to 
hit Jones. 
d. Also, specifically, Dunlap failed to assert the following facts as to 
Petitioner's underlying criminal representation of Randy Stoker and 
Marilyn Paul, which Petitioner hereby asserts are true: 
i. Neither of Petitioner's counsel ever investigated the 
aforementioned facts, despite the fact that an investigator was 
approved by the Court. Specifically, Petitioner believes that such 
investigation would have shown 1) bullet projections consistent with 
Petitioner's above recited facts of how the pistol was shot on both 
of the two discharges; 2) blood from Petitioner in the kitchen and in 
the bed of Petitioner's daughter's pickup, consistent with 
Petitioner's assertions that Jones initiated the first physical 
altercation by hitting Petitioner with a phone; and 3) that Jones had 
a quarrelsome, violent, dangerous and/or manipulative background, 
consistent with Petitioner's assertion that Jones struck Petitioner, 
threatened Petitioner's life and Petitioner's children's lives, and 
Jones made the initial move toward the pistol during the argument 
in the kitchen. 
ii. In the event that an investigation was conducted in 
Petitioner's underlying criminal case, Petitioner asserts that Dunlap 
failed to argue that Petitioner's underlying criminal counsel failed to 
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review the information obtained by any investigator. Petitioner 
specifically alleges hereby that neither Stoker nor Paul ever 
reviewed any information obtained by an investigator with her. 
iii. Neither of Petitioner's underlying counsel advised 
Petitioner of a potential self-defense or defense of others defense. 
Specifically, Petitioner was never advised of the burden of proof on 
a self-defense or defense of other defense in her alleged crime. 
More specifically, Petitioner was never advised that at trial, the 
burden would be on the prosecution to prove beyond a reasonable 
doubt that the homicide of Jones was not justifiable and that if a 
jury found that there is a reasonable doubt whether the homicide of 
Jones was justifiable, the jury would be instructed that it must find 
the defendant not guilty. In fact, Petitioner was led to believe that 
she bore the burden of proving a self-defense or defense of others 
defense in her case by her counsel. 
e. Additionally, Dunlap failed to investigate and challenge the facts 
as contained in the Pre-Sentence Investigation Report in this case, 
as they contradict with the facts as contained herein. Specifically, 
Dunlap should have challenged the following facts, which neither 
Stoker nor Paul investigated or argued at the Petitioner's 
sentencing: 1) that Petitioner's blood was at the scene in the 
kitchen and in Petitioner's daughter's truck; 2) that Petitioner did not 
have violent tendencies; and 3) that Petitioner never talked with any 
outside party about the facts of the case, including but not limited to 
the facts contained herein. 
f. Dunlap failed to communicate with Petitioner to discover 
Petitioner's desire to raise the foregoing facts and legal arguments 
in her Original Post-Conviction Petition. As such, Dunlap's Original 
Amended Petition summarily asserted that Petitioner "was not 
being properly advised/informed of the procedures taking place in 
her case" ( emphasis added). 
g. Had Dunlap rendered effective assistance as Petitioner's 
counsel, by completing the acts as stated above, Dunlap would 
have been able to effectively argue that Petitioner's counsel, Randy 
Stoker and Marilyn Paul, in her underlying criminal case were 
ineffective assistance to Petitioner. 
h. Had Stoker and Paul provided effective assistance as counsel to 
Petitioner, Petitioner would not have entered a guilty plea in this 
matter and would have proceeded successfully on a self defense or 
defense of others defense, after adequate investigation made on 
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the underlying facts to support the facts as recited and contained 
herein. 
Verified Amended Successive Petition, p. 3-7. (R. p. 80-84.) 
The state filed an answer to the Verified Amended Successive Petition 
which admitted some allegations and denied others. More to the point, it raised 
the following affirmative defenses: 
AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE ONE 
Petitioner's Successive Petition for Post-Conviction Relief is 
untimely. I. C. § 19-4902. 
AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE TWO 
Petitioner's Successive Petition for Post-Conviction Relief asserts 
issues that were effectively waived by the Petitioner's plea of guilty. 
I.C. § 19-4908 
AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE THREE 
Petitioner's Successive Petition for Post-Conviction Relief contains 
bare and conclusory allegations unsubstantiated by affidavits, 
records, or other admissible evidence, and therefore fails to raise a 
genuine issue of material fact. Idaho Code Sections 19-4902(a), 
19-4903, and 19-4906. 
AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE FOUR 
Petitioner' s Successive Petition for Post-Conviction Relief are 
clearly disproved by the record; and under such circumstances, 
Petitioner's allegations are insufficient for the granting of relief. 
AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE FIVE 
Petitioner's Successive Petition for Post-Conviction Relief could 
and should have been raised on direct appeal. As a result, such 
allegations are forfeited and may not be considered in post-
conviction proceedings. Idaho Code § 19-4901 (b ). 
AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE SIX 
Petitioner's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is 
unsubstantiated by facts that support her claim that her counsel's 
conduct fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and 
that Petitioner was prejudiced by his attorney's deficient 
performance. Wherefore Petitioner's claim fails for sufficiency. 
Answer, p. 1-2. (R. p. 108-109.) 
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The court then issued its order dismissing successive petition for post 
conviction relief. (R. p. 112-119.) Shortly thereafter it issued its amended order 
dismissing successive petition for post conviction relief. (R. p. 121-131.) It began 
by repeating its recitation of the procedural history from its notice of intent to 
dismiss. (R. p. 121-122.) The court continued by explaining: 
Finally, on May 12, 2011, Petitioner filed the current successive 
petitioner for post-conviction relief (Jerome County Case No. CV-
2011-559). On May 2, 2012, following the Court's Notice of Intent to 
Dismiss, which granted Petitioner's request for court-appointed 
counsel, Petitioner filed her Amended Successive Petition for Post 
Conviction Relief, followed by a Verified Amended Successive 
Petition for Post Conviction Relief1 filed on June 12, 2012, with 
[Footnote] 
1 Aside from the verification by Petitioner and some 
amended language, specifically roman iv. on page 4, the 
Verified Petition is the same as the original Amended 
Petition filed on May 2, 2012. Additionally, Petitioner's 
verification signature was not notarized. This is an error that 
the Court will disregard for purposes of this Order, which 
addresses the merits of Petitioner's claims. 
leave from the Court. Thereafter, on June 13, 2012, the State filed 
its Answer to Amended Successive Petition for Post Conviction 
Relief. 
Petitioner's original successive petition stated eighteen grounds for 
post-conviction relief, many of which had already been raised in 
prior motions or were not actionable claims under the Uniform Post 
Conviction Procedure Act (UPCPA). The original petition was 
supported only by Petitioner's statement of facts. This Court 
addressed the original successive petition in its Notice of Intent to 
Dismiss, which is incorporated herein by reference. The Amended 
Petition condensed these claims into one multi part claim of 
ineffective assistance of post-conviction counsel, which will be 
addressed in this opinion. 
Amended Order, p. 2-3. (R. p. 122-123.) 
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After explaining the ordinary standards for a post conviction relief petition 
alleging ineffective assistance of counsel, the court continued as follows: 
On the other hand, there is no constitutionally protected right to the 
effective assistance of counsel in post-conviction relief 
proceedings. Follinus v. State, 127 Idaho 897, 902 (Ct.App. 1995). 
Thus, such an allegation, in and of itself, is not among the 
permissible grounds for post-conviction relief. See Griffin v. State, 
142 Idaho 438, 441 (Ct.App. 2006); Wolfe v. State, 113 Idaho 337, 
339 (Ct.App. 1987). Ineffective ass1stance of prior post-conviction 
counsel may, however, provide sufficient reason for permitting 
newly-asserted allegations or allegations inadequately raised in the 
initial petition to be raised in a subsequent post-conviction petition. 
Schwartz v. State, 145 Idaho 186, 189 (Ct.App. 2008); See a/so 
Palmer v. Dermitt, 102 Idaho 591, 596 (1981); Hernandez v. State, 
133 Idaho 794, 798 (1999). Failing to provide a post-conviction 
petitioner with a meaningful opportunity to have his or her claims 
presented may be violative of due process. Schwartz, 145 Idaho at 
189; Hernandez, 133 Idaho at 799; See a/so Abbott v. State, 129 
Idaho 381,385 (Ct.App. 1996); Mellingerv. State, 113 Idaho 31, 35 
(Ct.App. 1987). 
Under I.C. § 19-4908, summary dismissal of a successive petition 
for post-conviction relief on the basis of waiver, under I.C. § 19-
4908, is only appropriate where the court finds that the successive 
petition failed to include newly-asserted grounds for relief in the 
prior post-conviction proceeding without sufficient reason. I.C. § 19-
4908; Hernandez, 133 Idaho 794. All grounds for relief available to 
a petitioner under the UPCPA must be raised in a petitioner's 
original, supplemental, or amended petition. I.C. § 19-4908. The 
language of I.C. § 19-4908 prohibits successive petitions in those 
cases where the petitioner "knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently" 
waived the grounds for relief sought in the successive petition or 
offers "no sufficient reason" for omitting those grounds in the 
original petition. See Palmer v. Dermitt, 102 Idaho 591, 593 (1981). 
However, I.C. § 19-4908 allows a petitioner to raise a ground for 
relief, which was addressed in a former petition, if he or she can 
demonstrate sufficient reason why the claim was inadequately 
raised or presented in the initial post-conviction petition. See 
Hernandez, 133 Idaho at 798. 
Petitioner asserted ineffective assistance of counsel in her initial 
petition; the Court does not find that she has asserted new grounds 
for relief in this petition. Therefore the issue is whether Petitioner 
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has demonstrated sufficient reason why her claims were 
inadequately raised or presented in the first petition. 
In the current petition, Petitioner alleges that her previous post-
conviction attorney, M. Lynn Dunlap, failed to verify the Amended 
Petition, failed to assert any specific facts to support her allegations 
that counsel gave ineffective assistance in the underlying criminal 
case, failed to assert facts which Petitioner asserts are true, and 
failed to adequately communicate with her regarding the facts and 
legal arguments contained in the original petition. Petitioner has not 
supported her claim with anything other than a copy of the Order 
Dismissing Petition for Post-Conviction Relief entered on August 
26, 2008 and a copy of the original Amended Petition for Post-
conviction Relief, filed by Mr. Dunlap on November 27, 2007. 
Notably, in the original amended petition, Mr. Dunlap attached 
fourteen exhibits in support of Petitioner's claims. The exhibits were 
letters she had written, including correspondence with the Idaho 
State Bar regarding a bar complaint she filed against Ms. Paul and 
Mr. Stoker, correspondence from Mr. Stoker regarding the status of 
his representation of her, and a letter to Judge Carlson expressing 
her concerns about counsel's representation of her. As previously 
stated, a claim for ineffective assistance of post-conviction counsel 
is not grounds for post-conviction relief; at most it may amount to a 
sufficient reason for courts to re-examine an original post-conviction 
petition for newly-asserted allegations or allegations inadequately 
raised. In sum, Petitioner has failed to demonstrate sufficient 
reason why her claims were inadequately raised or presented in the 
initial post-conviction petition. Significantly, Petitioner had two 
evidentiary hearings on her Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea. 
Petitioner also appears to have had multiple opportunities to 
present admissible evidence that her counsel was ineffective under 
the UPCPA. Therefore, summary dismissal of petitioner's 
successive petition on the basis of waiver is appropriate. 
Amended Order, p. 4-6 (footnote ommitted, emphasis added). (R. p. 124-126.) 
Despite dismissing the petition on procedural grounds, the court went on 
to brief address Petitioner's assertion regarding counsel in the underlying 
criminal case: 
The Petitioner claims counsel in her underlying criminal case, 
Randy Stoker and Marilyn Paul, failed to adequately investigate 
facts that petitioner has asserted as true. She alleges that there 
was either no investigation done in the underlying criminal case, or 
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that any information obtained by an investigator was not reviewed 
by original counsel and was thereby not reviewed by her. 
Petitioner has not met her burden of showing prejudice. Petitioner 
essentially raised this same claim; that she was inadequately 
advised regarding evidence, in her original petition. In his Order 
Dismissing Petition for Post-Conviction Relief, entered August 26, 
2008, Judge Daniel C. Hurlbutt stated the following: 
Petitioner asserts, as she did in her motion to withdraw her 
guilty plea, that she was not presented with the state's 
evidence against her and that she therefore could not have 
entered a knowing, voluntary, and intelligent guilty plea. The 
district court, in considering her motion to withdraw her guilty 
plea, addressed the merits of this contention. Specifically, 
the court highlighted the fact that the petitioner was present 
at her preliminary hearing and heard the evidence presented 
by the state at that hearing. The court also noted that the 
defendant was present at all or nearly all of the hearings on 
the admissibility of evidence against her. The court, after 
hearing evidence on the motion, denied the motion. 
While it is true that the Court of Appeals affirmed the denial 
on the grounds that the district court lacked jurisdiction to 
consider the motion in the first place, the fact remains that 
the record created by the proceedings on the motion to 
withdraw the guilty plea conclusively establishes that the 
defendant was aware of the evidence against her and 
entered a knowing, voluntary, and intelligent plea. 
Furthermore, the petitioner herself in her petition for post-
conviction relief admitted that she did go over evidence with 
at least Ms. Paul. . . . This combined with the facts 
established in the record directly rebut the petitioner's 
allegation that her guilty plea was not knowing, voluntary, 
and intelligent due to failure by counsel to inform the 
petitioner of the evidence against her. For that reason, the 
petitioner has failed to establish facts which would entitle her 
to relief. 
Order Dismissing, pp. 4-5. Petitioner is required to show prejudice 
in asserting a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, however, in 
her current petition, she states only that: 
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Had Stoker and Paul provided effective assistance as 
counsel to Petitioner, Petitioner would not have entered a 
guilty plea in this matter and would have proceeded 
successfully on a self defense or defense of others defense, 
after adequate investigation made on the underlying facts to 
support the facts as recited and contained herein. 
The Court finds that Petitioner's recitation of facts followed by a 
conclusory statement that she would not have pied guilty had 
counsel performed an adequate investigation into the facts she put 
forth, amount to nothing more than conclusory allegations, 
previously raised and adjudicated and unsupported by admissible 
evidence, and conclusions of law, which this Court is not required 
to accept. It is therefore appropriate for this Court to summarily 
dismiss Petitioner's successive petition without an evidentiary 
hearing. This is especially true in light of the numerous 
opportunities petitioner has been afforded to bring forth admissible 
evidence to support her claims of ineffective assistance of trial 
counsel. Further, there is nothing in the evidence to support 
Petitioner's contention that her claims were inadequately raised in 
the initial post-conviction relief petition. Therefore, Petitioner's 
Successive Petition for Post Conviction Relief is hereby 
DISMISSED. 
Amended Order, p. 7-8. (R. p. 127-128.) 
C. The Court Erred in Summarily Denying the Petition 
In short, the court erred because it dismissed the petition on different 
grounds than those raised in the notice of intent to dismiss or the state's answer. 
While the court dismissed the petition because Petitioner failed to establish a 
sufficient reason allowing the filing of a successive petition, the court's notice of 
intent to dismiss (and state's answer) complained only about the evidentiary 
insufficiency of the claims contained in the petition. In other words, the 
Petitioner was told only of factual insufficiency, not legal insufficiency. 
The grounds for the court's intended summary dismissal are again as 
follows: 
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. . . . Notably, the petitioner's application is supported only by a 
nine-page statement of facts. This does not amount to admissible 
evidence sufficient to make a prima facie case as to each element 
of Petitioner's numerous claims. In fact, Petitioner appears to have 
listed an exceptionally wide array of claims, some of which she has 
asserted in prior petitions and motions, supported only by her 
description of the facts as she sees them. 
Thus, Petitioner does not present adequate grounds upon which to 
base a successive application for post-conviction relief. Petitioner is 
hereby given twenty (20) days to reply to this proposed dismissal. I. 
C. § 19-4906(6). 
Notice of Intent to Summarily Dismiss, p. 2 (footnote omitted). (R. p. 31.) 
In response, the verified amended successive petition went to great 
lengths to provide Petitioner's statement as to the facts surrounding the crime, as 
well as discussed the facts of the representation of both trial counsel and initial 
post conviction counsel. 
But in its Amended Order (and not its Notice of Intent to Dismiss), the 
court framed the issue as follows: "Therefore the issue is whether Petitioner has 
demonstrated sufficient reason why her claims were inadequately raised or 
presented in the first petition." And of course, following its discussion of the law 
related to successive petitions, the court held that sufficient reason had not been 
shown. 
Nor was this ground for dismissal raised in the state's answer to the 
petition. While the state certainly complained that the prose successive petition 
was factually insufficient, it never suggested that the problem was that it did not 
sufficiently describe the sufficient reason why the successive petition could be 
brought in the first place. 
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In its well established in Idaho that the Petitioner must receive notice of 
the grounds for the proposed dismissal and an opportunity to respond to any 
deficiencies of the petition. This principle has been discussed in many Idaho 
cases, and is succinctly summarized in DeRushe v. State, 146 Idaho 599 (2009): 
The district court cannot dismiss claims on its own motion if it does 
not give the parties a twenty-day prior notice stating its reasons for 
doing so as required by Idaho Code§ 19-4906(b). Garza v. State. 
Likewise, if the State moves to dismiss a petition under Idaho Code 
§ 19-4906(c), the court cannot dismiss a claim on a ground not 
asserted by the State in its motion unless the court gives the 
twenty-day notice required by Section 19-4906(b). Saykhamchone 
v. State, 127 Idaho 319, 322, 900 P.2d 795, 798 (1995). A district 
judge also errs in dismissing a petition where the State does not 
allege any grounds for the dismissal, other than "Idaho Code §§ 19-
4901 et seq." Id. 
Id., p. 602. 
In our case, the Petitioner was never put on notice that the threshold 
issue was the legal question of whether she had demonstrated sufficient reason 
allowing the bringing of the successive petition. Thus, the summary dismissal 
on this basis was error and must be reversed and the matter remanded to the 
district court. 
Further, the dismissal cannot be upheld on the alternative grounds where 
the court purports to address the merits. The court incorrectly equates the claim 
from her initial petition, to wit, that her attorneys failed to advise her of the 
evidence, with the claim in her instant petition, to wit, that her attorneys failed to 
investigate and so were unaware of the evidence. Further, the court fails to 
explain why Petitioner's lengthy statement of facts which it treated as verified 
would not be admissible evidence supporting her claim. 
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To summarize, the order of summary dismissal must be reversed since it 
relied on grounds different from those in the Notice of Intent to Dismiss or the 
state's answer. What's more, the dismissal cannot be upheld under the 
alternative merits ruling because it does not actually address the merits, and in 
any event, does not consider the Petitioner's evidence. 
CONCLUSION 
Wherefore, for the reasons as stated above, Appellant/Petitioner 
respectfully requests that the district court's summary denial of the post 
conviction petition be reversed and that this matter be remanded for an 
evidentiary hearing. 
DATED this2 lday of March, 2013. 
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